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Introduction
Issues  on  the  missing  link  between 
performance  and  remuneration  have  been 
long discussed as they imply rent diversion 
by managers (Hassan, Christopher & Evans, 
2003; Abdullah, 2006; Desai & Dharmapala, 
2006). Managers benefit from remunerations   
by  way  of  increasing  personal  wealth  and 
reputation. In the latter case, in addition to 
being  highly  associated  with  outstanding 
achievement, it is also achieved through tax-
planning activities that in turn signify higher 
returns  to  the  shareholders.  In  Malaysia, 
as  there  is  no  limit  in  claiming  directors’ 
remuneration  expense,  the  tendency  to 
manipulate the directors’ remuneration as a 
tax-planning technique is higher especially 
UTILISATION OF DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION 
IN TAX PLANNING
NOR SHAIPAH ABDUL WAHAB
NUR AZLIANI HANIZA CHE PAK
UUM College of Business
 Universiti Utara Malaysia
Abstract
Companies involve in tax planning due to its primary benefit of increase after-tax return. 
However, this activity has been an ongoing discussion as it impairs provision of public goods 
which indirectly causes social issues. Companies, in conducting tax planning, make use of 
several techniques to effectively minimise the tax burden, for example, profit sharing, income 
shifting and change of characteristics of income. Directors’ remuneration is also identified 
as a tax-reduction strategy. While increasing the wealth of the directors, higher directors’ 
remuneration expense reduces company taxable income and in turn raises company tax 
savings.  This provides indications about the missing link between directors’ performance and 
pay. In fact, in Malaysia, this issue has been long debated by the public including academics. 
Despite this highlight, little attention has been given to the relationship between tax planning 
and directors’ remuneration. Therefore, this paper reports the results of this study’s focus of 
attention on whether tax planning activity is significantly related to directors’ remuneration 
expenses  of  non-financial  Malaysian  public-listed  companies.  The  sample  period  of  the 
study is from 2007 to 2009. The panel dataset is drawn from Datastream and hand-collected 
tax data from company annual reports. The results derived from the multivariate analyses 
highlight the extent of the relationship between tax planning and directors’ remuneration and 
thus enlighten the knowledge on the utilisation of directors’ remuneration as a strategy in tax 
planning. The results also highlight the policy and reporting implications to the authority. 
Keywords: Tax planning, directors’ remuneration, corporate governance, tax rates.h
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within  companies  that  have  lower  ceiling 
limits of remunerations. From a survey on 
directors’  remuneration  by  loss-suffering 
companies,  KPMG  finds  that  a  significant 
number  of  the  said  type  of  companies 
continued to reward their directors well in 
2005 (NST, 4 October 2006). This provides 
indication that performance was not a crucial 
element  for  consideration  in  deciding  the 
directors’ remuneration (Shanmugam, Ming, 
Tan, Mahmud & Hassan, 25 August 2003).
In terms of an association between directors’ 
remuneration  and  tax  planning,  however, 
conflating directions may exist in line with 
the argument on complementary relationship 
between  managers’  concern  on  diversion 
and  tax  sheltering.  Evidence  from  the  US 
highlights  findings  that  managers  with 
higher  incentives  possess  lower  intention 
in corporate tax planning as such incentives 
reduce managers’ rent diversion that in turn 
accompanies lower tax sheltering activities 
and  this  can  further  explain  variations  of 
undersheltering  puzzles  within  companies 
(Desai  &  Dharmapala,  2006).    In  the 
Malaysian setting, significance of directors’ 
remuneration  as  a  tax-motivated  expense 
allocation is documented by Abdul Wahab 
(2011).  The  author  finds  robust  results  on 
significance of the component of directors’ 
remuneration  as  an  expense  in  corporate 
effective  tax  rates  (ETR).  The  results  are 
consistent  when  testing  variations  across 
industries  and  years  of  the  panel  sample 
period (2007-2009). 
Despite the findings, utilisations of directors’ 
remuneration in tax planning may not hold 
throughout  all  individual  tax  bases  as  the 
individual  tax  rates  in  Malaysia  exceed 
corporate tax rate when the formers’ taxable 
income  reaches  RM100,000.  Generally, 
companies  in  Malaysia  are  liable  to  pay 
corporate  tax  at  statutory  tax  rates  (STR) 
of 20 per cent on chargeable income up to 
RM500,000  for  companies  with  paid-up 
capital  not  exceeding  RM2.5  million;  and 
of  25  per  cent  for  other  cases.  However, 
variations in ETR are observed due to, among 
else, utilisation of tax provisions, incentives, 
and income shifting (Abdul Wahab, 2011). 
This  suggests  tax  planning  existence  as 
ETR explains the tax portion of the reported 
income (Rego, 2003) and sequentially ETR 
departures from the STR explain tax saving 
derived therefrom. This further will lead to 
lower tax revenue in the hand of the Malaysian 
tax authority, the Malaysian Inland Revenue 
Board (IRB).
Therefore,  the  focus  of  attention  of  this 
research is twofold. Firstly, to what extent 
is directors’ remuneration related to the tax 
planning activities? Secondly, do reductions 
in individual tax rates contribute to variations 
in  corporate  tax-planning  activities?  The 
findings of this research would enlighten the 
knowledge on tax-planning activities among 
the  Malaysian  public-listed  companies.  It 
would also contribute to knowledge in the 
sense of providing empirical evidence about 
the  influence  of  directors’  remuneration  in 
tax-planning strategy in Malaysia. Further, 
this  research  will  also  contribute  to  the 
taxation  literature  in  explaining  the  affect 
of individual tax rate reduction on corporate 
tax-planning strategy. This research is useful 
to the authorities to gauge the level of the 
manipulation  of  directors’  remuneration 
in  tax  computation  and  hence,  highlights 
policy  implication  to  both  companies  and 
authorities. 
Directors’ Remuneration in Tax Planning
Directors’  remuneration  is  the  incentive 
or  compensation  paid  to  directors  for 
performing their duties. This payment, as to h
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reflect the worth of managers’ efforts, needs 
to  be  aligned  with  company  performance 
as  such  expense  is  justified  as  to  increase 
shareholders’  wealth  (Jensen  &  Meckling, 
1976).  But  this  premise,  practically,  is 
claimed as not holding true due to the lack 
of  congruence  between  remuneration  and 
performance. This is documented by Firth, 
Tam  and  Tang  (1999)  in  their  study  on 
the  determinants  of  top  management  pay. 
The  authors  find  evidence  that  instead  of 
performance, company size is a major top-
management remuneration determinant. 
This  performance-pay  misalignment  issue, 
although  mixed  arguments  have  been 
put  forward,  may  relate  to  tax-planning 
activities. Desai and Dharmapala (2006), in 
a study on tax avoidance and high-powered 
incentive, highlight potential implications of 
remuneration on tax planning. On positive 
intuitive arguments, higher remuneration is 
claimed as being able to can align managers-
shareholders  interests  and  thus  increases 
tax- planning activities. On the other hand, 
if  the  payment  is  viewed  as  being  able 
to  lower  the  managerial  rent  diversion, 
higher  remuneration  is  likely  to  reduce 
tax-planning  activities.  All  these  premises 
support  arguments  on  the  association  of 
remuneration and tax planning. Particularly 
in Malaysia, the opportunity to manipulate 
the expenses is found to be higher due to 
unlimited  allowable  expense  of  directors’ 
remuneration in corporate tax computation 
(Income  Tax  Act  1967  (With  Completed 
Rules & Regulations), 2008).  The specified 
provision of the Act, Section 33 of the Income 
Tax Act 1967, stipulates that the allowable 
expenses  are  only  the  expenses  that  are 
wholly  and  exclusively  incurred  during  a 
basis  period,  without  any  reference  to  the 
limitations of the deductions. Therefore, as 
far as the taxable income determination is 
concerned, tax planning could also be one 
of  the  determinants  to  the  directors’  pay 
misalignment issue.
In the US, this issue has been in the authority’s 
attention  since  early  1990s.    The  US 
authority,  through  Revenue  Reconciliation 
Act 1993, limits the corporate tax deduction 
for executive compensation to $1 million per 
individual (Balsam & Ryan, 1996). In addition 
to benefiting the shareholders in the sense of 
reducing the gap between performance and 
pay, it also contributes to tax revenue by way 
of reducing remuneration manipulation in tax-
planning activities. Therefore, based on the 
above  discussions,  directors’  remuneration 
is documented as contributing to the level of 
corporate tax planning activities. Hence, it is 
hypothesised that:
H1:    There  is  a  significant  association 
between the level of companies’ tax-
planning  activities  and  directors’ 
remuneration.
Reduction in Individual Tax Rates and 
Directors’ Remuneration
 
Tax planning, if conducted effectively, will 
result in tax saving in the sense of higher 
after-tax return (Scholes & Wolfson, 1992) 
and  higher  available  cash  flow  (Jones  & 
Rhoades-Catanach,  2005).  These  returns 
can then be channelled to investment either 
in asset or equity terms. Savings can also be 
gained through reduction of tax rates. Through 
US evidence, individual tax rates are found 
to be associated with capital investment due 
to the incremental effect on cash flow (Black, 
Legoria  &  Sellers,  2000).  This  finding 
supports the arguments on the relationship 
between  reduction  in  individual  tax  rates 
and  directors’  remuneration  in  explaining h
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the  extent  of  tax-planning  activities  in 
which theoretically, with the existence of 
individual tax rates reduction, increments 
of directors’ remuneration decreases the tax 
payments by companies and simultaneously 
increases the managerial personal wealth.
Despite these arguments, reservation should 
be made based on the tax base of an individual 
taxpayer.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the 
individual tax rates in Malaysia are lower 
as compared to the corporate tax rate of up 
to RM100,000 of the chargeable income of 
the individual taxpayer. Thus, the direction 
to the extent which the remuneration may 
contribute to tax planning depends on the 
existence of individual tax rate reductions. 
Malaysia experienced several reductions in 
individual tax rates i.e. during 1991, 1993, 
1995, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2009 and 2010. 
Therefore during these years, it was expected 
that the reduction would increase the tax 
saving and thus it would be channelled to 
investment  in  companies  (Abdul  Wahab, 
Aripin,  Md  Idris  &  Che  Ahmad,  2007). 
In line with the presumption, the level of 
corporate tax planning was expected to be 
related to the reduction in the individual tax 
rates. Thus, it is hypothesised that:
H2: The level of corporate tax planning is 
associated with the reduction in individual 
tax rates.
Firm-specific Characteristics
In  order  to  control  the  firm-specific 
characteristics, this study includes several 
variables that have been found by previous 
researchers  to  be  important in  explaining 
cross-sectional differences in tax planning 
(Kern  &  Morris,  1992;  Omer,  Molloy  & 
Ziebart,  1993;  Gupta  &  Newberry,  1997; 
Holland,  1998;  Kim  &  Limpaphayom, 
1998;  Derashid  &  Zhang,  2003).  The 
firm-specific  characteristics  discussed  in 
this  study  consist  of  firm  size,  leverage, 
capital  intensity,  foreign  sales,  earnings 
management and industry classifications. 
Zimmerman  (1983)  says  that  size  of  a 
company is positively related to the ETR 
since  large  firms  are  exposed  to  greater 
public  scrutiny  and  thus,  the  companies   
have to incur the political cost. In contrast, 
Porcano  (1986)  highlights  that  there  is 
a  negative  association  between  size  and 
ETR due to greater resources by the larger 
firm  to  influence  the  above-mentioned 
political cost. In line with Porcano (1986), 
Derashid and Zhang (2003), in the study 
on a Malaysian sample, find a significant 
negative association between firm size and 
ETR. Gupta and Newberry (1997) also find 
a significant negative relationship between 
size and ETR among 915 U.S. firms during 
four years i.e. 1987–1990. However, during 
1982–1985,  with  823  samples  of  U.S. 
firms , the finding presents that there is a 
significant positive relationship of firm size 
and ETR. 
In line with firm size, Derashid and Zhang 
(2003)  also  find  similar  results  among 
Malaysian companies about the relationship 
of leverage and ETR. This may be due to 
tax deduction by interest tax shield. 
Another  firm-specific  characteristic 
controlled in this study is capital intensity. 
Capital  intensity,  which  explains  the 
utilisation of property, plant and equipment 
in the business activity, is highly correlated 
to the industrial membership. For example, 
companies  in  industrial  chemicals  and 
electrical  machinery  tend  to  have  high 
capital  utilisation  (Lim,  1976).  Gupta h
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and  Newberry  (1997)  and  Derashid  and 
Zhang  (2003)  find  a  significant  negative 
relationship  between  capital  intensity  and 
ETR.  This  shows  that  companies  with  a 
greater proportion of fixed asset utilise the 
tax deduction in lowering the ETR (Gupta 
& Newberry, 1997). The deductions include 
capital allowance and incentive provision. 
The  next  firm  characteristic  is  earnings 
management. It is important to control this 
for the manipulation of financial accounting 
items  by  managers  due  to,  among  other 
things,  the  intention  that  is  based  on 
contractual settings, for instance, in  terms 
of leverage, bonus plan and size (Holland & 
Jackson, 2004). This is in line with Healy and 
Wahlen’s  (1999)  explanation  that  earnings 
management  “occurs  when  managers  use 
judgement  in  financial  reporting  and  in 
structuring  transactions  to  alter  financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance 
of the company or to influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers”  (Healy  &  Wahlen,  1999: 
368).  Consistent  with  Healy  (1985)  and 
Phillips, Pincus and Rego (2003), earnings 
management in this study is measured based 
on total accrual measures which is derived 
by subtracting nett cash flow from operation 
from  profit  before  tax.  This  specifically 
controls for variation in the tax planning that 
arises from earnings management (Desai & 
Dharmapala, 2009).
Further, the extent of foreign sales is also 
controlled  as  a  proxy  for  the  company’s 
involvement  in  multinational  business. 
The extent of foreign sales is important as 
companies with a high level of multinational 
business  activities  may  have  greater 
opportunity to plan their tax. This method of 
tax planning is related to profit or income-
shifting in which, multinational companies 
may plan their tax by transferring their profit 
or taxable income to lower tax jurisdictions. 
The relationship between tax planning and 
the extent of multinational activities has been 
empirically verified by previous researchers 
(for  example,  Klassen,  Lang  &  Wolfson, 
1993;  Mills,  Erickson  &  Maydew,  1998; 
Rego, 2003). Therefore, in order to control 
the  effect  of  the  extent  of  multinational 
operations  on  cross-sectional  difference, 
the extent of foreign sales is included in the 
testing as a control variable. 
In  addition  to  the  above  firm-specific 
characteristics, industry classification could 
also be associated with ETR. For example, 
manufacturing and hotel industries were found 
to be negatively related to ETR (Derashid 
&  Zhang,  2003).  This  is  due  to  different 
opportunity  sets,  for  example,  a  different 
investment incentive which is available for 
a  different  industry  classification.  In  other 
words,  it  indicates  different  tax  planning 
opportunities  across  sectors  (Mills  et  al., 
1998). Econometrically, this control variable 
is important to explain the heterogeneity of 
the samples. 
Research Design
The data of this research is collected from 
Thomson  Financial  Datastream  and  hand-
collected  tax  and  remuneration  data  from 
company  annual  reports.  The  sample 
consists of non-financial Malaysian public-
listed  companies  (excluding  finance,  trust 
and  closed-end  fund  industries  as  those 
industries are governed by special rules and 
regulations). The sample period is from 2007 
to  2009  to  incorporate  the  latest  available 
data  for  panel  data  analysis.  To  reflect 
persistent ability in conducting tax planning h
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activities, following Mills et al. (1998), loss-
suffering companies are excluded. Similarly, 
companies with negative tax charge are also 
excluded to control influence on tax planning 
measures  by  other  than  the  current-year-
taxable-income factor. A further restriction 
imposed  on  the  sample  is  the  companies   
have  extreme  ETR  value  (ETR>1)  due  to 
non-recurring  statutory  reconciling  items 
(Phillips, 2003).  Table 1 presents the sample 
selection  process  that  leads  to  the  initial 
sample  of  321  companies,  i.e.  a  strongly 
balanced panel data of 963 firm-years.
50
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ß4LEVit+ß5EMit+ß6CAPINTit+ß7FS
it+∑ ßn
14
n=8
INDDUMit+εit
activities, following Mills et al. (1998), loss-
suffering companies are excluded. Similarly, 
companies with negative tax charge are also 
excluded to control inﬂuence on tax planning 
measures  by  other  than  the  current-year-
taxable-income factor. A further restriction 
imposed  on  the  sample  is  the  companies   
 
have  extreme  ETR  value  (ETR>1)  due  to 
non-recurring  statutory  reconciling  items 
(Phillips, 2003).  Table 1 presents the sample 
selection  process  that  leads  to  the  initial 
sample  of  321  companies,  i.e.  a  strongly 
balanced panel data of 963 ﬁrm-years.
Table 1
Sample Selection
Details Number of 
observations
Number of 
companies
Non-ﬁnancial public-listed companies 801
At least one year of annual report is not available (89)
Accounting period of more than 12 months (14)
Not available in  Datastream (9)
Negative proﬁt before tax (306)
Negative tax charge (46)
1011 337
Extreme value of ETR (17)
Unbalanced data (31)
Initial sample 963 321
Model Speciﬁcation
The empirical analysis of this study is based 
on  the  following  model  that  is  employed 
to  investigate  the  association  between  tax 
planning and directors’ remuneration.
TPit=ß0+ß1DRit+ß2DITRRit+ß3SIZEit+ 
Where:
TP  =  Tax planning, measured  
  as STR – ETR (ETR is 
  measured as a ratio of  
  current income tax   
           payable to pre-tax
   income.
DR  =  Directors’remuneration, 
  measured as aratio of   
  total directors’ 
  remuneration to   
  beginning book value of  
  equity.
DITRR  =  Dummy measure of   
   individual tax rates  
  reduction; 1 for  
  reduction, 0 otherwise. h
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Further explanations on tax planning (TP), 
directors remuneration (DR) and reduction in 
individual tax rates (DITRR) are discussed in 
the next three sub-sections. Other variables, 
SIZE, LEV, EM, CAPINT, FS and INDDUM 
are  control  variables  as  they  reflect  firm 
specific characteristics (discussed in section 
2.3 above) which, either directly or indirectly, 
contribute to opportunities of tax planning.
Tax Planning Measure
Company  tax  burden  information  is 
not  publicly  available  which  thus  leads 
researchers  to  proxy  the  measure  using 
several variables such as ETR (for example 
Zimmerman, 1983; Porcano, 1986; Holland, 
1998; Mills et al., 1998; Rego, 2003; Dyreng, 
Hanlon,  &  Maydew,  2008)  and  book-tax 
gap  (Desai  &  Dharmapala,  2009).1  This 
study measures tax planning as the saving 
derived therefrom which can be calculated as 
deviations of current tax expenses from the 
STR. This measure is in line with Salamon 
and Siegfried (1977) and is often used by 
previous tax-burden literature as it represents 
the  ability  of  companies  to  exploit  and 
manipulate provisions in the tax systems and 
codes. This in turn, reflects firm behaviour 
in tax planning by way of political scrutiny 
(Zimmerman,  1983),  accruals  (Holland, 
1998)  and  manipulation  of  book-income 
(Northcut & Vines, 1998).
As current tax expense explains tax payable 
by companies in a year of assessment, ETR is 
measured to reflect the ratio of tax expense to 
the profit of the year. Despite this definition, 
several ways have been used to measure ETR 
to suit the studies’ objectives and needs, for 
example, tax payable over pre-tax accounting 
income (Porcano, 1986; Rego, 2003) and tax 
payable  over  cash  flow  (Singh,  Wilder  & 
Chan, 1987; Gupta & Newberry, 1997). To 
avoid potential issues related to cash flow, 
for  example  timing  incongruence  between 
cash  flow  and  accruals,  and  dissimilarities 
between  bases  to  determine  tax  paid  and 
tax  liability,  this  study  measures  ETR  by 
deflating  current  tax  expense  with  profit 
before tax (PBT).2
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Further explanations on tax planning (TP), 
directors remuneration (DR) and reduction in 
individual tax rates (DITRR) are discussed in 
the next three sub-sections. Other variables, 
SIZE, LEV, EM, CAPINT, FS and INDDUM 
are  control  variables  as  they  reﬂect  ﬁrm 
speciﬁc characteristics (discussed in section 
2.3 above) which, either directly or indirectly, 
contribute to opportunities of tax planning.
Tax Planning Measure
Company  tax  burden  information  is 
not  publicly  available  which  thus  leads 
researchers  to  proxy  the  measure  using 
several variables such as ETR (for example 
Zimmerman, 1983; Porcano, 1986; Holland, 
1998; Mills et al., 1998; Rego, 2003; Dyreng, 
Hanlon, & Maydew, 2008) and book-tax gap 
(Desai  &  Dharmapala,  2009).1  This  study 
measures tax planning as the saving derived 
therefrom  which  can  be  calculated  as 
deviations of current tax expenses from the 
STR. This measure is in line with Salamon 
and Siegfried (1977) and is often used by 
previous tax-burden literature as it represents 
the  ability  of  companies  to  exploit  and 
manipulate provisions in the tax systems and 
codes. This in turn, reﬂects ﬁrm behaviour 
in tax planning by way of political scrutiny 
(Zimmerman,  1983),  accruals  (Holland, 
1998)  and  manipulation  of  book-income 
(Northcut & Vines, 1998).
As current tax expense explains tax payable 
by companies in a year of assessment, ETR is 
measured to reﬂect the ratio of tax expense to 
the proﬁt of the year. Despite this deﬁnition, 
several ways have been used to measure ETR 
to suit the studies’ objectives and needs, for 
example, tax payable over pre-tax accounting 
income (Porcano, 1986; Rego, 2003) and tax 
payable  over  cash  ﬂow  (Singh,  Wilder  & 
Chan, 1987; Gupta & Newberry, 1997). To 
avoid potential issues related to cash ﬂow, 
for  example  timing  incongruence  between 
cash ﬂow and accruals, and dissimilarities 
between  bases  to  determine  tax  paid  and 
tax  liability,  this  study  measures  ETR  by 
deﬂating  current  tax  expense  with  proﬁt 
before tax (PBT).2
    
SIZE  =  Size of company,   
  measured as a ratio of  
  total asset to beginning  
  book value of equity.
LEV  =  Leverage of company,  
  measured as a ratio of  
  long-term debt to total  
  asset.
EM  =  Earnings management,  
  measured as a ratio of  
  the difference between  
  proﬁt before tax and   
  cash from operation, to  
  beginning book value of  
  equity.
CAPINT  =  Capital intensity of  
  company, measured as  
  a ratio of gross machine  
  and equipment to total  
  asset.
FS  =  Foreign sales, measured  
  as a percentage of   
  foreign sales to net sales.
INDDUM  =  Dummy measure of  
  industrial product  
  industry.
  
�  =  Error termh
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Thus, as ETR explains the ratio of tax paid by 
companies to the profit generated in the year, 
departure  of  ETR  from  STR  signifies  tax 
saving derived from tax-planning activities. 
Therefore, in light of this, tax planning in this 
study is measured as the difference between 
STR and the firm ETR.3   
Directors Remuneration Measure
The directors remuneration variable in this 
study is defined as remuneration expense to 
directors (accrual basis). The data is hand-
collected  data  from  notes  to  the  accounts 
from company annual reports. To control bias 
of inconsistency in reporting remuneration 
in  the  forms  of  benefit-in-kind,  the  items 
are filtered out from the measurement. This 
data is further scaled with beginning book 
value  of  equity  to  control  for  scale-effect 
heteroscedasticity (Stark & Thomas, 1998; 
Akbar & Stark, 2003; Horton, 2008). 
   
Dummy  Measure  of  Reduction  in 
Individual Tax Rates
In assessing whether reductions in individual 
tax rates contribute to the extent of corporate 
tax planning activities, a dummy variable of 
individual tax rates reduction is included in 
the regression model. The reduction which 
affects the activity in the sense of increased 
cash flow, as discussed above, can then be 
channelled to investment in increasing the 
personal wealth. In addition, the reduction 
attracts the managers’ attention to focus more 
on personal tax planning instead of company 
tax-planning  activities.    Throughout  the 
sample  period,  the  tax  rates  had  declined 
once in 2009 and hence the data is coded as 
“1” for 2009 and “0” for other cases.
Results
This  section  discusses  the  results  derived 
from  the  analyses.  Prior  to  the  analyses, 
several diagnostic tests had been conducted 
to  analyse  the  underlying  assumption  of 
the  tests.  Outliers  of  40  observations,  i.e. 
observations with studentized residual value 
of  >|2|  (Chen,  Ender,  Mitchell  &  Wells, 
2005),  were  excluded.  As  a  consequence, 
a further 62 observations were excluded to 
ensure a balanced panel dataset. In assessing 
influential  observation,  exclusion  of  56 
observations had been done based on critical 
value of DEFIT measure, i.e. abs DFIT>2*(P/
N)1/2 (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980).4 This 
is further followed by the exclusion of 49 
observations  to  balance  the  data.  These 
exclusions  result  in  a  final  sample  of  756 
observations, i.e. 252 companies. The model 
was also analysed for multicollinearity using 
correlation  matrices  and  variance  inflation 
factor  (VIF)  measure  (Hair,  Black,  Babin, 
Anderson, & Tatham, 2006), and condition 
indices  (Belsley  et  al.,  1980).  The  tests 
indicate insignificant multicollinearity.5
Descriptive Statistics
Table  2  presents  descriptive  statistics  of 
the  final  sample  utilised  in  estimating  the 
regression model. Averagely the tax saving 
derived  from  the  tax-planning  activities 
during the three-year sample period is 5.23 
per cent given the STR of 27, 26 and 25 per 
cents respectively for years 2007 until 2009. 
This  implies  the  existence  of  tax-planning 
activities  of  large  Malaysian  public-listed 
companies. The scaled directors remuneration 
variable  (DR)  which  indicates  an  average 
of  0.01421  represents  a  higher  portion  of 
remuneration than the firm beginning book 
value of equity.  h
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
n=756 Mean Min Max Standard deviation
TP 0.05232 -0.24080 0.27000 0.09342
DR 0.01421 0.00004 0.09356 0.01323
SIZE 1.99590 0.87558 10.82186 0.89761
LEV 0.06911 0.00000 0.36907 0.08320
EM 0.01763 -1.30682 1.61361 0.18732
CAPINT 0.18630 0.00000 1.06506 0.20983
FS (%) 9.81670 0.00000 100.00000 19.14045
Regression Results
The results from the estimation model are 
presented in Table 3. As the Breusch-Pagan/ 
Table 3
Regression Results
Dependent variable: TP ßn
DR
-0.08286
(-0.32)
DITRR -0.02350
(-4.83)***
SIZE 0.00604
(1.36)
LEV 0.05577
(1.18)
EM 0.03819
(2.41)**
CAPINT 0.08868
(4.03)***
FS 0.00015
(0.81)
Cook-Weisberg  tests  for  heteroscedasticity   
indicate  signiﬁcant  inconstant  variance  of 
residuals,  the  reported  results  are  based 
on  clustered  Eicker-Huber-White  adjusted 
standard errors (Petersen, 2009). 
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The  reported  coefficients  show  a  negative 
relationship between directors’ remuneration 
(DR)  and  the  extent  of  tax-planning 
activities (TP). This result, however, is not 
significant (p=0.748) indicating that directors 
remuneration  is  not  a  significant  driver  in 
tax-planning activities of Malaysian public-
listed  companies.  Therefore,  the  result 
fails to support hypothesis H1 in testing the 
relationship between directors remuneration   
and  the  extent  of  company  tax-planning 
activities. 
In  investigating  the  relationship  between 
reduction of individual tax rate (DITRR) and 
the level of corporate tax-planning activities, 
the  results  in  Table  3  report  a  significant 
(p=0.000)  negative  coefficient  which 
suggests that managers put in less effort on 
corporate tax planning when the reduction 
in individual tax rate is available. This result 
supports the moral hazard theory (Jensen & 
Meckling,  1976)  in  explaining  managers’ 
conflict of interest in pursuing their personal 
wealth  while  managing  the  companies  on 
behalf of the shareholders. Thus, the result 
supports  hypothesis  H2  in  examining  the 
relationship between reduction of individual 
tax  rates  and  the  extent  of  corporate  tax-
planning activities.
 
In  addition  to  the  above,  Table  3  reports 
a  positive  and  significant  (p=0.016) 
relationship between earnings management 
(EM) and corporate tax planning (TP). This 
expected result, suggesting higher earnings 
management, explains a higher level of tax-
planning  activities.  Similarly,  the  expected 
positive  sign  of  a  relationship  between 
capital intensity (CAPINT) and tax planning 
(TP) is documented suggesting utilisation of 
capital allowance provision in corporate tax 
planning.
Further Analysis
To assess the robustness of the above results, 
several  further  analyses  were  conducted. 
The analyses comprise re-estimation using a 
fixed-effect estimation model, non-linearity 
of  directors’  remuneration  variable  (DR), 
analyses  based  on  median  of  directors’ 
remuneration  (DR)  and  endogeneity  test 
using a lag variable.
The  results  derived  based  on  firm  fixed-
effect  estimation  model  are  qualitatively 
similar  to  the  initial  results  based  on  the 
random-effect estimation model. Hence, the 
initial  results  are  robust  upon  controlling 
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The  reported  coefﬁcients  show  a  negative 
relationship between directors’ remuneration 
(DR)  and  the  extent  of  tax-planning 
activities (TP). This result, however, is not 
signiﬁcant (p=0.748) indicating that directors 
remuneration  is  not  a  signiﬁcant  driver  in 
tax-planning activities of Malaysian public-
listed  companies.  Therefore,  the  result 
fails to support hypothesis H1 in testing the 
relationship between directors remuneration 
and  the  extent  of  company  tax-planning 
activities. 
In  investigating  the  relationship  between 
reduction of individual tax rate (DITRR) and 
the level of corporate tax-planning activities, 
the  results  in  Table  3  report  a  signiﬁcant 
(p=0.000)  negative  coefﬁcient  which 
suggests that managers put in less effort on 
corporate tax planning when the reduction 
in individual tax rate is available. This result 
supports the moral hazard theory (Jensen & 
Meckling,  1976)  in  explaining  managers’ 
conﬂict of interest in pursuing their personal 
wealth  while  managing  the  companies  on 
behalf of the shareholders. Thus, the result 
supports  hypothesis  H2  in  examining  the 
relationship between reduction of individual 
tax  rates  and  the  extent  of  corporate  tax-
planning activities.
In  addition  to  the  above,  Table  3  reports 
a  positive  and  signiﬁcant  (p=0.016) 
relationship between earnings management 
(EM) and corporate tax planning (TP). This 
expected result, suggesting higher earnings 
management, explains a higher level of tax-
planning activities. Similarly, the expected 
positive  sign  of  a  relationship  between 
capital intensity (CAPINT) and tax planning 
(TP) is documented suggesting utilisation of 
capital allowance provision in corporate tax 
planning.
Further Analysis
To assess the robustness of the above results, 
several  further  analyses  were  conducted. 
The analyses comprise re-estimation using a 
ﬁxed-effect estimation model, non-linearity 
of  directors’  remuneration  variable  (DR), 
analyses  based  on  median  of  directors’ 
remuneration  (DR)  and  endogeneity  test 
using a lag variable.
The  results  derived  based  on  ﬁrm  ﬁxed-
effect  estimation  model  are  qualitatively 
similar  to  the  initial  results  based  on  the 
random-effect estimation model. Hence, the 
initial  results  are  robust  upon  controlling 
Dependent variable: TP ßn
Constant
0.06129
(3.91)***
Industry dummy Yes
n 756
R-squared 29.22%
Wald 187.99(12)***
Breusch-Pagan 31.79(12)***
Note
Figures in parentheses represent cross-section clustered Eicker-Huber-White adjusted t-statistics.
***, ** and * indicate signiﬁcance level at 1%, 5% and 10% (two-tailed) respectively.h
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for heterogeneity of firm characteristics. In 
examining  the  possibility  of  non-linearity 
relationship  between  tax  planning  and 
directors remuneration, the results reported 
in Table 3 were re-estimated by incorporating 
quadratic variable of directors remuneration 
(DR2).  The  results  indicate  insignificant 
change  in  R-squared  (∆F=0.70,  p=0.4015) 
suggesting qualitatively no different than the 
initial estimation model. 
In testing whether a higher level of incentive 
may  influence  the  extent  of  tax-planning 
activity differently than the other counterpart 
(Desai  &  Dharmapala,  2006),  the  data 
was regressed based on the median of DR. 
Both  estimations  (higher  and  lower  than 
the  median  of  DR)  indicate  insignificant 
difference than the combined estimation as 
reported in Table 3. Further, to investigate 
the endogeneity issue in the data, the model 
was re-estimated by the inclusion of lagged 
variable of DR (Larcker & Rusticus, 2007). 
This is important in controlling violation of 
zero-conditional-mean  assumption  of  the 
regression model (Baum, 2006). The initial 
results are robust of which the added variable 
is  reported  as  insignificant  (p=0.390)  in 
explaining its relationship with TP.
To  assess  variations  in  annual  results,  the 
data  was  annually  regressed.  The  initial 
results of the panel data are similar to the 
annual reported regression results. Therefore, 
the  results  can  be  concluded  as  consistent 
throughout the sample period.
Conclusions
This  study  reports  an  existence  of  tax-
planning activities of the Malaysian public-
listed  companies. The  results  of  the  study 
find  a  insignificant  relationship  between   
directors’  remuneration  and  the  extent  of 
corporate tax-planning activities suggesting, 
unlike the US study (Desai & Dharmapala, 
2006),  directors’  remuneration  is  not  a 
significant  component  in  tax-planning 
decisions.  This  result  is  consistent  upon 
controlling several factors; firm fixed-effect, 
non-linearity  of  directors’  remuneration 
variable  (DR),  analyses  based  on  median 
of  directors’  remuneration  (DR)  and 
endogeneity. The result is also qualitatively 
persistent throughout the years. Further, this 
study  documents  an  adverse  relationship 
between  the  availability  of  individual  tax 
rates  reduction  and  the  level  of  corporate 
tax-planning  activities.  This,  from  agency 
theory’s point of view (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976),  indicates  managerial  intention  to 
pursue personal wealth objective instead of 
maximising firm value for shareholders. 
This  study  contributes  to  knowledge  by 
highlighting  the  corporate  tax-planning 
level in Malaysia. It also contributes to the 
taxation and corporate governance literature 
by suggesting further evidence in supporting 
managerial conflict of interest through tax-
planning.  The  authorities  have  also  been 
highlighted  with  the  evidence  of  little 
consideration of directors’ remuneration in 
corporate tax-planning activities.
Applying  the  results  to  the  population, 
however, is limited due to restrictions applied 
to the selected sample. Therefore, it may be 
worth while in future studies to extend this 
study  by  employing  a  larger  sample  size 
comprising various categories and sizes of 
companies. 
During  the  study  period  (2007–2009),  not 
only  the  individual  tax  rate  was  reduced 
but the corporate tax rate was also reduced.   
However, those changes were not taken into h
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account during this time of analysis.  Thus, 
future study may include this reduction in 
corporate tax rate in the analysis to see the 
influence on the results.  
It is also important to highlight the limitation 
of  the  tax-planning  measure  as  it  implies 
the  tax  expense  disclosed  in  the  financial 
statement.  However,  as  mentioned  above, 
as the tax burden data is kept confidential, 
previous  literature  continues  proxying  tax 
planning with ETR measure. Therefore, the 
result of this study should be interpreted with 
an acknowledgement of the limitations of the 
actual tax burden measurement and thus it is 
essential for authorities to consider limitation 
in tax disclosure in financial reporting. 
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End Notes
1Algebraically,  the  measure  of  ETR  is 
equivalent to book-tax gap measure where 
PBT(ETR-STR)=(taxable  income  –  PBT)
STR.
2A study by Derashid and Zhang (2003) finds 
no significant correlation between ETR and 
cash  flow  differences  between  these  two 
measures in reflecting firm tax burden.
3 STR of large companies in Malaysia for 
years of assessments 2007, 2008 and 2009 
were 27, 26 and 25 per cents respectively.
4 P is defined as the number of independent 
variables  and  N  is  the  number  of 
observations.
5 All bivariate correlation coefficients of the 
variables are below 0.9 and the VIF value is 
less than 10 (Hair et al., 2006). The maximum 
condition index is 9.61 that is below that the 
threshold level of 30 (Belsley et al., 1980).
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